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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (k) , §78-2-2(4), and §78-2-2 (3) (j) 
(1953, as amended). 
ISSUES FOR AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following questions of law should be reviewed to 
determine whether the trial court's interpretation of 
statutes, rules, and ordinances was correct--State v. Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1993): 
1. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in 
finding that the plaintiffs failed to extend the option to 
purchase the premises as provided for in the Agreement. 
2. The trial court erred in finding that the defendants 
were the prevailing parties, and in awarding the defendants, 
and not the plaintiffs, their attorneys fees. 
Determinative Provisions. 
1. Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-1(1953, as amended). 
2. Utah Code Ann., § 25-5-3(1953, as amended), 
3. Utah Code Ann., § 78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs, in or about May, 1995, caused to be filed 
their Verified Complaint alleging that defendants had breached 
a Lease Agreement with an Option to Purchase which the parties 
had entered into in April 1994. The Verified Complaint sought 
specific performance as a remedy, as well as monetary damages 
for defendants' alleged breach. On or about June 29, 1995, 
defendants caused to be filed their Answer and Counterclaim, 
alleging that plaintiffs were in unlawful detainer of the 
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subject premises. 
A trial was held in this matter on November 3, 1995. 
Following the taking of evidence and testimony, the Court 
orally announced its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Court found that plaintiffs, in July and August 1994, were 
in default of the lease-option agreement (the "Agreement") 
which the parties had previously executed, but also found that 
defendant had waived his right to terminate the Agreement by 
accepting rental payments which were due on September 15, 
1995. The Court also found that plaintiffs had failed to 
validly exercise the option provided for in the Agreement, and 
that plaintiffs had failed to indicate to defendant that they 
were extending the option for an additional year as provided 
for in the Agreement. Based upon those findings, the Court 
held that plaintiffs were month-to month tenants of defendant, 
that defendant had properly served plaintiffs with a Three-Day 
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit on May 17, 1995, that plaintiffs 
were in unlawful detainer, and that a Writ of Restitution 
should issue restoring possession of the premises to defendant 
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if plaintiffs had not vacated the premises prior to December 
1, 1995. The trial court entered judgment against the 
plaintiffs in the amount of $345.00, in addition to the 
defendants' costs of court. 
The order appealed from in this case is the Judgment, 
orally announced by the trial court following the trial which 
was held on November 3, 1995, and entered by the Honorable 
Sandra N. Peuler of the Third District Court on November 17, 
1995. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment was filed with the 
trial court on November 13, 1995. The Order denying 
plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Judgment was entered by the trial 
court on February 20, 1996. The Notice of Appeal was filed 
with the district court on February 28, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
In or about May 1994, plaintiffs and defendant, Joseph 
Stumph (hereinafter referred to as Mefendant"), entered into 
a lease-option agreement (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Agreement") for the premises located at 3160-3170 South 7945 
West, Magna, Utah (hereinafter referred to as the "premises"). 
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The Agreement provided that plaintiffs would pay $1000.00 per 
month as and for rent for the premises. The Agreement 
specifically provided as follows: 
Within one year, until May 1, 1995, Selfs will 
have option to purchase property for $70,000.00 
(seventy thousand dollars) with a credit of 
$200.00 per month being credited toward a down 
payment. This option may continue for a second 
year thru April 30, 1996, except on May 1, 1995 
the $70,000 price will be adjusted upward to 
reflect the general price increase of property 
in SL County. 
The Agreement further provided as follows: 
On January 1, 1995 monthly lease payment will 
increase to $1,100.00 from $1,000.00 per month 
with $200.00 per month continuing to be credited 
toward a down payment if Self exercise their 
option to purchase. Selfs may continue their 
option for a second year until May 1, 1996, but 
the $70,000 base price will be adjusted upward 
to reflect the general increase in property 
values in Salt Lake County according to the 
official data of the Salt Lake Board of 
Realtors. Such upward adjustment in price shall 
not include any actual improvements made to the 
property by Selfs, only the general increase in 
values of all residential properties in 
Salt Lake County. 
On May 1, 1995, monthly lease payment will be 
reduced to $900.00 per month if Selfs exercise 
option for another year, but none of this amount 
will be credited toward a down payment if option 
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to purchase is exercised. If option to 
purchase is exercised both parties will pay 
normal fees as seller and buyer, namely, closing 
costs. Unless and until Selfs actually purchase 
property, owner will be responsible for property 
taxes and fire insurance, but Selfs will be 
responsible for renters7 insurance if they wish 
to insure their personal property. 
The Agreement does not specify the method or means by which 
plaintiffs were required to indicate to defendant that they 
intended to extend the option for an additional year. 
Finally, the Agreement provided that if any payment from the 
plaintiffs was more than 15 days late, the defendant, at his 
option, could terminate the Agreement. 
In July 1994, plaintiffs paid to defendant the sum of 
$729.00 as and for rent for the premises. In August 1994, 
plaintiffs paid to defendant the sum of $1500.00, constituting 
the balance of rent for the month of July 1994, rent for the 
month of August 1994, as well as applicable late fees. This 
amount still left $101.00 owing for rent for the month of 
August 1994. During the month of August 1994, plaintiffs were 
making substantial improvements to the premises. At that 
time, plaintiffs informed defendant that they would not be 
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able to pay the balance of August's rent because they were 
spending the money making improvements to the premises. 
Plaintiffs asked defendant if he would "foreclose" on the 
Agreement, to which he responded in the negative. 
In September 1994, plaintiffs paid to defendant the sum 
of $1501.00, constituting the balance owing for August 1994 
rent, September 1994 rent, applicable late fees, as well as 
payment of a $400.00 note owing to defendant. At that point 
in time, plaintiffs were current on all payments due under the 
Agreement. Subsequent to plaintiffs making their payment in 
September 1994, defendant caused to be served upon plaintiffs 
a notice that he was exercising his right to terminate the 
Agreement because of their late payments. 
Subsequent to September 1994, plaintiffs continued to 
make improvements to the premises, and continued to make their 
lease payments to defendant pursuant to the Agreement. 
Commencing in January 1995, plaintiffs made payments to 
defendant of $1100.00 per month as and for rent for the 
premises pursuant to the Agreement, which defendant accepted 
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without objection. Defendant continued to accept these 
increased rental payments through April 1995. 
In February 1995, plaintiffs exercised their option to 
purchase the premises by presenting defendant with an Earnest 
Money Agreement setting forth the terms of the purchase as 
provided in the Agreement. Defendant refused to sign the 
Earnest Money Agreement, and refused to cooperate with the 
plaintiffs in taking the necessary steps to complete the sale 
of the premises. On April 28, 1995, plaintiff Talmadge Self 
had a conversation with the defendant in which he informed the 
defendant that he would be paying $900.00 rent for May 1995 
pursuant to the Agreement. In May 1995, plaintiffs tendered 
to defendant the sum of $900.00 as and for rent for the 
premises pursuant to the Agreement. Defendant refused 
plaintiffs' tender, indicating that the rent due was $1100.00, 
and caused to be served upon plaintiffs a Three-Day Notice to 
Pay Rent or Quit. When plaintiffs did not vacate the 
premises, defendant caused to be filed a Counterclaim, 
asserting a claim for unlawful detainer. 
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A trial was held in this matter on November 3, 1995. 
Following the taking of evidence and testimony, the Court 
orally announced its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
The Court found that plaintiffs, in July and August 1994, were 
in default of the lease-option agreement (the "Agreement") 
which the parties had previously executed, but also found that 
defendant had waived his right to terminate the Agreement by 
accepting rental payments which were due on September 15, 
1995. The Court also found that plaintiffs had failed to 
validly exercise the option provided for in the Agreement, and 
that plaintiffs had failed to indicate to defendant that they 
were extending the option for an additional year as provided 
for in the Agreement. Based upon those findings, the Court 
held that plaintiffs were month-to month tenants of defendant, 
that defendant had properly served plaintiffs with a Three-Day 
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit on May 17, 1995, that plaintiffs 
were in unlawful detainer, and that a Writ of Restitution 
should issue restoring possession of the premises to defendant 
if plaintiffs had not vacated the premises prior to December 
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1, 1995, The trial court entered judgment against the 
plaintiffs in the amount of $345.00, in addition to the 
defendants' costs of court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants claim that the trial court erred in holding 
that they failed to properly extend the option to purchase the 
subject premises for an additional year as provided for in the 
Agreement. However, because the Agreement is silent as to the 
method of giving notice of the extension of the option, oral notice 
of such intent is sufficient. Furthermore, evidence was presented 
at the trial of thi$ matter establishing that plaintiffs gave 
defendants oral notice of their intent to extend the option. The 
trial court therefore erred in holding that plaintiffs had failed 
to properly extend the option. 
Because the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs had 
failed to properly extend the option, it also erred in finding that 
defendants were the prevailing parties, and in awarding them 
attorney's fees. The Agreement provides that a party seeking to 
enforce the provisions of the Agreement is entitled to an award of 
his attorney's fees if he prevails. Because plaintiffs should have 
prevailed on their claim that they properly extended the option, 
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they should also have prevailed on defendants' Counterclaim. 
Because plaintiffs should have been the prevailing parties, they 
should have been awarded their attorney's fees, rather than 
defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
FAILED TO EXTEND THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PREMISES AS 
PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT. 
In the matter at hand, the trial court found, following 
the trial, that appellants had failed to indicate to appellees 
that they intended to extend the option for an additional year 
as provided for in the Agreement. The trial court ruled that 
because the notice was oral, it violated the Statute of Frauds 
and was void and of no effect. However, because the 
underlying Agreement was specific in its terms, and was silent 
as to the method of giving notice of the intent to extend the 
option, oral notice was sufficient to accomplish the extension 
of the option. 
The Agreement specifically provided as follows:. 
Within one year, until May 1, 1995, Selfs will 
have option to purchase property for $70,000.00 
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(seventy thousand dollars) with a credit of 
$200.00 per month being credited toward a down 
payment. This option may continue for a second 
year thru April 30, 1996, except on May 1, 1995 
the $70,000 price will be adjusted upward to 
reflect the general price increase of property 
in SL County. 
The Addendum to Lease further provided as follows: 
On January 1, 1995 monthly lease payment will 
increase to $1,100.00 from $1,000.00 per month 
with $200.00 per month continuing to be credited 
toward a down payment if Self exercise their 
option to purchase. Selfs may continue their 
option for a second year until May 1, 1996, but 
the $70,000 base price will be adjusted upward 
to reflect the general increase in property 
values in Salt Lake County according to the 
official data of the Salt Lake Board of 
Realtors. Such upward adjustment in price shall 
not include any actual improvements made to the 
property by Selfs, only the general increase in 
values of all residential properties in Salt 
Lake County. 
On May 1, 1995, monthly lease payment will be 
reduced to $900.00 per month if Selfs exercise 
option for another year, but none of this amount 
will be credited toward a down payment if option 
to purchase is exercised. If option to purchase 
is exercised both parties will pay normal fees 
as seller and buyer, namely, closing costs. 
Unless and until Selfs actually purchase 
property, owner will be responsible for property 
taxes and fire insurance, but Selfs will be 
responsible for renters' insurance if they wish 
to insure their personal property. 
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The Agreement does not specify the method or means by which 
plaintiffs were required to indicate to defendants that they 
intended to extend the option for an additional year. 
Counsel for appellants could not locate any reported 
opinions from Utah discussing the issue of what notice is 
necessary to exercise or extend an option agreement when the 
agreement itself fails to identify the method of such notice. 
However, in Vozar v. Francis, 519 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1978), the 
Supreme Court of Alaska addressed an issue nearly identical to 
that in the instant matter. The Vozar Court addressed a 
lease-option agreement which did not identify the method by 
which the optioners were required to notify the optionee of 
their intent to exercise the option. The Vozar Court held 
that in the absence of an express requirement in an option to 
purchase agreement that notice to exercise the option to 
purchase must be in writing, the option may be exercised 
verbally or by any other method indicated in the optioner's 
election to avail himself of the option. Id. at 1059-1060. 
Although the Vozar opinion discusses the method of giving 
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notice to exercise an option, its reasoning may also be 
applied to the method by which an optioner is required to give 
notice of his intent to extend an option for an additional 
period of time. 
The Washington Court of Appeals also dealt with a nearly 
identical issue in Ban-Co Inv. Co. v. Loveless, 587 P. 2d 567 
(Wash.App. 1978). In that case, the court addressed whether 
oral notice of intent to exercise an option to purchase 
property is barred by the Statute of Frauds. The Ban-Co court 
held that it is settled that the acceptance of a written 
option to purchase real estate is not invalid because it is 
oral. Id. at 573. The Ban-Co court noted that the rationale 
behind such position is that the Statute of Frauds is 
sufficiently complied with in such a situation because the 
detailed terms of the contract to sell are supplied by the 
writing signed by the parties to be held. Id. 
The appellees rely on Wardley Corp. Better Homes and 
Gardens v. Burgess, 810 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1991), to support 
their argument that the Statute of Frauds requires the 
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appellants' notice to extend the option be in writing. That 
opinion, however, is distinguishable from the matter at hand. 
In the Wardley opinion, the Court of Appeals dealt with a real 
estate listing agreement that did not provide, in its terms, 
for any extension of the agreement. The Wardley court 
therefore held that any extension of the agreement was 
required to be in writing to be enforceable. Unlike the 
situation in Wardley, the Agreement between appellants and 
appellees specifically provided, in writing, for the extension 
of the Agreement. The reasoning of the Wardley court is 
therefore not applicable in this matter. 
In the matter at hand, the detailed terms of the sale of 
the property are contained in the lease-option agreement. The 
parties have therefore sufficiently complied with the Statute 
of Frauds. The oral notice given by appellants to appellees 
of their intent to extend the option period for an additional 
year, absent any language in the agreement setting forth the 
method of giving such notice, was sufficient and evidence of 
such notice is not barred by the parol evidence rule. 
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Accordingly, because appellants gave appellees notice of their 
intent to extend the option period for an additional year, and 
because such notice was not required to be in writing, the 
trial court's ruling should be reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings. 
There is also ample evidence in the record supporting the 
fact that plaintiffs gave oral notice to the defendants of 
their intent to exercise the option. The evidence establishes 
that plaintiff, Talmadge Self, had a conversation with the 
defendant, Joseph Stumph, on April 28, 1995 in which he 
informed the defendant that he would be paying $900.00 for 
May's rent pursuant to the Agreement. Because the Agreement 
provides that the rental payment would decrease to $900.00 per 
month in May 1995 if the plaintiffs extended the option for an 
additional year, plaintiffs' action in informing the defendant 
that he would pay $900.00 in rent for May 1995 constituted 
notice that plaintiffs were exercising their right to extend 
the option. Furthermore, plaintiffs tendered to defendant 
$900.00 in rent for May 1995, which constitutes additional 
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notice that plaintiffs were extending their option. The 
defendant refused the $900,00, and indicated instead that the 
rent would be $1100.00 per month. However, because the trial 
court ruled that defendant had waived his right to terminate 
the Agreement, the Agreement was still in effect on April 28th 
when plaintiffs notified defendant that they would be paying 
$900.00 in rent for May 1995. Thus, defendant did not have 
the right to refuse plaintiffs' exercise of their right to 
extend the option, and also did not have the right to 
unilaterally revise the terms of the Agreement. 
Because the evidence establishes that plaintiffs notified 
defendant on April 28, 1995 that they would be paying $900.00 
rent for May 1995, and because plaintiffs in fact tendered 
that amount to defendant, plaintiffs gave notice to defendant 
that they wished to extend the option to purchase the property 
for an additional year. Furthermore, because the Agreement is 
silent on the method or means by which plaintiffs were 
required to notify defendant of their intent to extend the 
option, the oral notification by plaintiffs was sufficient to 
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extend the option. Therefore, the trial court's ruling should 
be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS 
WERE THE PREVAILING PARTIES AND IN AWARDING THEM 
THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Following the trial in this matter, the trial court found 
that defendants were the prevailing parties in the litigation, 
and awarded them a portion of the attorney's fees which they 
had incurred in conducting the litigation. However, because 
the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs had failed 
to properly extend the option as provided for in the 
Agreement, the trial court also erred in finding that 
defendants were the prevailing parties. 
The trial court's ruling should therefore be reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
The Agreement provides, with regard to attorney's fees, 
as follows: 
In the event that Owner shall prevail in any legal 
action brought by either party to enforce the terms 
hereof or relating to the demised premises Owner 
shall be entitled to all costs incurred in connection 
with such action, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. 
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Under this provision, defendants would be entitled to their 
attorney's fees if they prevailed in an action relating to the 
Agreement or the demised premises. However, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56.5 provides that a party has a reciprocal right to 
attorney's fees under such a clause if it prevails. That 
Section provides as follows: 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions 
of the promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allows at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended). 
In the matter at hand, the trial court found that 
defendants were the prevailing parties, and awarded them a 
portion of the attorney's fees which they had incurred. 
However, the trial court erred in ruling for the defendants. 
See Part I, supra. Thus, the trial court was also incorrect 
in awarding the defendants their attorney's fees. 
Consequently, this matter should be reversed and remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs request the following specific relief: 
1. For an Order reversing or remanding the trial court's 
decision that th£ plaintiffs failed to properly extend the 
option to purchase the subject premises for an additional 
year. 
2. For an Order reversing or remanding the trial court's 
decision that the defendants 
were the prevailing parties and entitled to their attorney's 
fees. 
3. For an order awarding the plaintiffs their costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '2Pi day of July, 1996. 
QjL*bfm £ WENDY M. LEWIS' 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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